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Abstract This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game
theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and
their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected
by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homot-
opy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and
the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games,
and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms
to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas
can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how
homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.
Keywords Homotopy · Equilibrium computation · Non-cooperative games ·
Nash equilibrium
JEL Classification C62 · C63 · C72 · C73
1 Introduction
Economic research in the twentieth century has benefited greatly from the develop-
ment of game theoretic tools. Typically, an economic situation is modeled as a game,
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followed by an analysis of the outcomes of the game that satisfy a particular solution
concept, typically that of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements.
Since the analysis of Nash equilibria is key to the understanding of the situation at
hand, much attention has been given to the development of methods by which Nash
equilibria can be computed. We adhere to the view expressed in Judd (1997) that
computational methods will serve an important role in the further development of
economic theory, and in this case in the progress of game theory.
This survey provides an overview of a great variety of methods for Nash equilib-
rium computation that have been proposed. Although quite distinct in the specifics of
the mathematical techniques used, all these methods share the property that they are
guaranteed to converge to some Nash equilibrium. We argue that the homotopy idea
is common to all these methods, and this idea should therefore be considered as the
main driving force behind convergence. The homotopy idea is also extremely helpful
in obtaining a thorough understanding of the methods themselves.
Advantages of the use of homotopy methods include their numerical stability, their
potential to be globally rather than only locally convergent, their ability to potentially
locate multiple solutions, and the insight they provide into properties of the solutions.
Favorable by-products are that homotopies can be used for proving existence of an
equilibrium and for the generic oddness of the number of equilibria. Similar to the
view of Eaves and Schmedders (1999) “. . . inevitable and lasting role which homotopy
methods will play in both theoretical and applied economic analysis” we believe in
an important role for homotopy methods in game theory.
The homotopy idea is very simple. It consists of, first, the problem of interest, second
an artificial problem that can easily be solved, and third a continuous transformation
of the easy to solve artificial problem into the problem of interest. The homotopy idea
then consists of solving the easy artificial problem first and then using the solution to
solve the transformations of the easy problem until finally the problem of interest has
been solved. Section 2 explains why a deep mathematical result known as Browder’s
fixed point theorem (Browder 1960), see also the extension by Mas-Colell (1974), is
the fundamental reason that this approach works under very general assumptions.
We will refer to the easy to solve problem as the starting problem, the problem of
interest as the terminal problem, and the problems created by the continuous transfor-
mation as the intermediate problems. The choice of different starting problems and the
choice of different transformations of the starting problem to the terminal problem,
creates different homotopy algorithms. We will explain all algorithms in these terms.
Our survey consists of two main parts. Part 1 (Sects. 5, 6) is devoted to the study
of bimatrix games, whereas Part 2 (Sects. 8, 9, 10, 11) treats general n-person games.
The reason for this distinction is that in bimatrix games it is possible to find exact
solutions for starting, intermediate and terminal problems, whereas general n-person
games require some approximation method to find solutions.
Section 5 starts with a presentation of what is probably the best-known algorithm
for the computation of Nash equilibria, the one of Lemke and Howson (1964). This
algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium by solving a related linear complementarity prob-
lem. An alternative to the Lemke–Howson algorithm is provided by the algorithm of
van den Elzen and Talman (1991), described in Sect. 6. The latter algorithm allows
for an arbitrarily chosen starting point.
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The algorithms of Sects. 5 and 6 can be generalized to n-person games. For the
Lemke–Howson procedure, such generalizations are given in Rosenmüller (1971) and
Wilson (1971). Herings and van den Elzen (2002) extend the algorithm of van den
Elzen and Talman (1991) to the n-person case. A difficulty to compute Nash equilibria
in n-person games is posed by the non-linearity of the terminal problem. This makes
it impossible to solve the intermediate problems exactly. Herings and van den Elzen
(2002) tackle this problem by approximating the intermediate problems by piecewise
linear ones, which can be solved exactly. Section 8 discusses the simplicial techniques
that are needed for this approach. Section 9 presents the algorithm of Herings and
Peeters (2001). This algorithm exploits the differentiability of game theoretic prob-
lems. The techniques needed for this approach come from differential topology and
are presented in detail.
The Herings–van den Elzen and the Herings–Peeters algorithms, as well as the van
den Elzen–Talman algorithm, compute the Nash equilibrium selected by the equilib-
rium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Another algorithm with a nice
game theoretic interpretation is the one related to the quantal-response equilibrium
of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). This approach is explained in detail in Sect. 10.
Although McKelvey and Palfrey do not give an algorithmic interpretation of their
theory themselves, the results as presented in this survey make such an interpretation
obvious.
Section 11 provides an overview of other homotopy methods that have been pro-
posed to compute Nash equilibria. Section 12 discusses how the methods presented
in the other sections can be extended to extensive form games and dynamic games.
Section 13 explains how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria of a
game. Section 14 concludes.
2 Homotopy methods
In topology, two continuous functions from one topological space to another are called
homotopic if one can be “continuously deformed” into the other. Such a deformation
is called a homotopy between the two functions. Formally, a homotopy between two
continuous functions f and g from a topological space X to a topological space Y is
defined to be a continuous function H : [0, 1] × X → Y such that, for all points x in
X , H(0, x) = f (x) and H(1, x) = g(x). If we think of the homotopy-parameter in
[0, 1] as “time,” then H describes a “continuous deformation” of f into g: at time 0
we have the function f , at time 1 we have the function g.
A properly defined homotopy can be used to solve for the zeros of the function
g starting from the zeros of the function f and gradually solve the nearby functions
for increasing values of the homotopy parameter. This type of procedure is called
a homotopy method. Just for the sake of convenience we consider the homotopy
method from the perspective of finding a fixed point rather than a zero point in the
remainder of this section. The following mathematical result due to Browder (1960)
delivers the key insight for why homotopy methods converge under very general cir-
cumstances.
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Theorem 1 Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rd and let H : [0, 1]×
S → S be a continuous function. Then the set of fixed points, FH = {(λ, s) ∈
[0, 1]× S | s = H(λ, s)} contains a connected set, FcH , such that ({0}× S)∩ FcH = ∅
and ({1} × S) ∩ FcH = ∅.
The set of fixed points FH of H contains a connected subset FcH that intersects
the two extremes: {0} × S and {1} × S. This result suggests the following algorithm.
Represent the problem for which a solution has to be computed, the terminal problem,
as a fixed point problem, i.e. formulate a function H |{1}×S : {1} × S → S such that
a fixed point of H yields a solution to the terminal problem, where H |A denotes the
restriction of the function H to the domain A. Formulate the starting problem as a fixed
point problem, an artificial function H |{0}×S : {0} × S → S with usually a unique
fixed point, say s0, that can be computed easily. Define H |(0,1)×S : (0, 1) × S → S
in any way that makes H continuous on [0, 1] × S. By Theorem 1, the point (0, s0)
is connected by FcH to a fixed point (1, s1) of H . Homotopy methods are methods to
follow the connected set FcH .
The following result, due to Mas-Colell (1974), shows that Theorem 1 can be
generalized to the case of upper hemi-continuous correspondences.
Theorem 2 Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rd and let H : [0, 1]×
S → S be an upper hemi-continuous correspondence that is non-empty and convex-
valued. Then the set of fixed points, FH = {(λ, s) ∈ [0, 1]× S | s ∈ H(λ, s)} contains
a connected set, FcH , such that ({0} × S) ∩ FcH = ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ FcH = ∅.
Since the dimension of the domain of H is one higher than the dimension of its
range, it is usually possible to formulate appropriate regularity conditions for which
the solution is a compact, piecewise differentiable one-dimensional manifold, i.e. a
finite collection of arcs and loops. The algorithms for bimatrix games in Sects. 5
and 6 achieve this by a nondegeneracy condition. For n-person games, the appro-
priate regularity conditions are discussed in detail in Sect. 9. We will also pres-
ent methods that work without such regularity conditions, most notably in Sect. 8
where we explain how lexicographic pivoting techniques can be used for the general
case.
If the starting problem is constructed to have a unique fixed point, and appropriate
regularity conditions are made, then there is a unique arc, also referred to as path or
homotopy path, from this unique fixed point to a fixed point in {1}× S. At this point it
should be remarked that even if there is a unique arc, it may bend backwards, so under
the interpretation of the homotopy parameter t as time, following the homotopy path
may involve going backward in time.
3 Notation
A finite n-person noncooperative game in normal form is a tuple Γ = 〈N , {Si }i∈N ,
{ui }i∈N 〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of players, Si = {si1, . . . , simi } is the
finite set of strategies that player i has at his disposal, and ui is a real valued function
on the set of all possible strategy combinations  i∈N Si . A mixed strategy of player i
123
Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory 123
is a probability distribution on Si . Thereto we define Σ i as the set of all probability
distributions over Si . For σ i ∈ Σ i , the probability assigned to pure strategy sij is given
by σ ij . The payoff function is extended multi-linearly to the set of all mixed strategy
combinations Σ =  i∈N Σ i . Given a mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ and a mixed
strategy σ¯ i ∈ Σ i , we denote by (σ−i , σ¯ i ) the mixed strategy combination that results
from replacing σ i by σ¯ i . A mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ is said to be a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ if σ i is a best response against σ−i for all i ∈ N . The set
of Nash equilibria of the game Γ is denoted by NE(Γ ). We define the disjoint union
of the pure strategies over all players by S = ⋃i∈N Si with m =
∑
i∈N mi as the
cardinality of this set. All vectors in this survey are column vectors. The symbol  is
used for transposition.
The case n = 2 is referred to as a bimatrix game. A bimatrix game can be repre-
sented by a pair of m1 × m2 matrices (A1, A2), where u1(σ 1, σ 2) = (σ 1) A1σ 2 and
u2(σ 1, σ 2) = (σ 1) A2σ 2.
The vector ei is the vector of length mi for which each element is equal to 1, eij is
the vector of length mi for which the j th element is equal to 1 and all other elements
0, and 0i is the vector of length mi for which each element is equal to 0. For a matrix
M , we define by Mi • the i th row and by M • j the j th column of the matrix M .
4 Homotopies to compute Nash equilibria
In this section we present the homotopies underlying the algorithms of Lemke–How-
son (Sect. 5), van den Elzen–Talman (Sect. 6), Herings–van den Elzen and Herings–
Peeters (Sects. 8, 9), and McKelvey–Palfrey (Sect. 10). The homotopies underlying the
Herings–van den Elzen and the Herings–Peeters algorithm are identical. These algo-
rithms only differ in the numerical technique that is used to follow the homotopy path.
All the homotopies can be stated as correspondences from [0, 1]×Σ into Σ . Since all
algorithms are designed to find a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ , all homotopies share
the same terminal problem. We define H |{1}×Σ as the product of the best response
correspondences β i , i ∈ N , in the game Γ , where β i (σ ) = arg maxσ¯ i ∈Σ i ui (σ−i , σ¯ i ).
Clearly, the set of fixed points of the terminal problem coincides with the set of Nash
equilibria of Γ .
The homotopies also have in common that, for each t ∈ [0, 1), the set of fixed points
of H |{t}×Σ coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of a particular perturbation Γ (t)
of Γ . The correspondence H |{t}×Σ is defined as the product of best response corre-
spondences in the game Γ (t). The game Γ (0) is chosen to be a game with a unique
Nash equilibrium that is easily computed.
The homotopy H of the previous paragraph is a correspondence. Using the tech-
niques of Herings (2000) and Geanakoplos (2003), it is possible to define a continuous
homotopy function with exactly the same homotopy path. This is achieved by replac-
ing the best response correspondence of player i by a function that assigns to (t, σ )
the unique strategy σ¯ i that maximizes the payoff in Γ (t) to player i minus a quadratic
term given by the Euclidean distance to σ i . The quadratic term is equal to zero at a
fixed point, so fixed points do still correspond to Nash equilibria of Γ (t).
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4.1 The Lemke–Howson algorithm
Let Γ be a bimatrix game and let α be a bonus sufficiently large to make any pure
strategy a dominant strategy once this bonus is given for the use of this strategy, for
instance α = maxh,σ uh(σ ) − minh,σ uh(σ ) + ε, where ε > 0. Given such an α
and a pure strategy sij ∈ Si , we define, for t ∈ [0, 1], the bimatrix game Γ (t) =
〈N , {Sh}h∈N , {vh(t, ·)}h∈N 〉, where for player i , vi (t, s) equals ui (s) + (1 − t)α if
si = sij and ui (s) otherwise; for the other player, denoted by −i , v−i (t, s) = u−i (s).
The correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ → Σ is defined by
H(t, σ ) =
∏
h∈N
βh(t, σ ), (1)
where βh(t, σ ) = argmaxσ¯ h∈Σh vh(t, σ−h, σ¯ h) is the best response correspondence
of player h in game Γ (t). The strategy profile consisting of strategy sij and a best
response of the opponent is, by construction, an equilibrium of the game Γ (0). By
gradually increasing t from 0 to 1, the bonus on sij is gradually decreased from α to 0,
and the game of interest is reached. The set of strategy profiles of the homotopy path
coincides precisely with the set of strategy profiles generated by the Lemke–Howson
algorithm. Theorem 2 implies that a Nash equilibrium of Γ (0) is connected to a Nash
equilibrium of Γ (1) = Γ .
4.2 The van den Elzen–Talman algorithm
Let Γ be a bimatrix game and let ν ∈ Σ be an arbitrarily chosen starting profile. For
the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm one defines a family of subsets Σ(t) of Σ , where
Σ(t) = (1 − t){ν} + tΣ for t ∈ [0, 1]. The set of strategy profiles Σ(t) generates a
game Γ (t). By construction, ν is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (0).
We define the correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ → Σ by




Σ i (t)(σ ), (2)
where β i
Σ i (t)
(σ ) = argmaxσ¯ i ∈Σ i (t) ui (σ−i , σ¯ i ) is the best response correspondence
of player i in game Γ with restricted set of mixed strategies Σ i (t). The set of strat-
egy profiles of the resulting homotopy path coincides with the set of strategy profiles
generated by the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm. Notice that the starting profile ν
affects the homotopy for all values of t below 1. Theorem 2 implies that the unique
Nash equilibrium of Γ (0) is connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ (1) = Γ .
4.3 The Herings–van den Elzen algorithm and the Herings–Peeters algorithm
Let Γ be an n-person game and let p ∈ Σ be a prior belief. For every t ∈ [0, 1],
Γ (t) is defined as the game 〈N , {Si }i∈N , {vi (t)}i∈N 〉, where the payoff function
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vi (t) : Σ → R of player i is defined by vi (t, σ ) = tui (σ ) + (1 − t)ui (p−i , σ i ).
The game Γ (0) corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that their
opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. Any profile of best
responses constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γ (0). The game Γ (1) coincides with the
original game Γ .
Next, we can define the homotopy correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ → Σ by
H(t, σ ) =
∏
i∈N
β i (t, σ ), (3)
where as before β i (t, σ ) is the set of best responses of player i in game Γ (t) against
strategy profile σ−i . The set of strategy profiles of the resulting homotopy path coin-
cides with the set of strategy profiles numerically followed by the Herings–van den
Elzen and the Herings–Peeters algorithm. This homotopy coincides with the linear
tracing procedure as defined by Harsanyi (1975). Notice that the prior belief p affects
the homotopy for all values of t below 1. For the two-player case, choosing p = ν,
(3) and (2) are equivalent in the sense that, for t > 0, (t, σ ) is a fixed point of (3) if
and only if (t, (1 − t)p + tσ) is a fixed point of (2). Theorem 2 implies that the Nash
equilibrium of Γ (0) is connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ (1) = Γ .
4.4 The McKelvey–Palfrey algorithm
Another homotopy method related to n-person games is derived from the quantal
response theory of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). McKelvey–Palfrey do not give an
algorithmic interpretation of their theory themselves, but the results presented in this
survey make such an interpretation obvious.
In the quantal response theory, the payoff to player i when playing pure strat-
egy sij against a mixed strategy combination σ−i is subject to error and is given by
vi (σ−i , sij ) = ui (σ−i , sij )+ εij (t), where εij (t) represents the error term. Here player
i’s error vector εi (t) is distributed according to a distribution with density function
ϕi such that E(εij (t)) = 0. We refer the reader to Sect. 10 for more details on quantal
response theory.
A particular example concerns the case where ϕi corresponds to the extreme value
distribution. In this case, player i has the statistical response function defined by
β ij (λ, σ ) =
exp(λui (σ−i , sij ))
∑mi
k=1 exp(λui (σ−i , sik))
(sij ∈ Si , i ∈ N ).
where β ij should be interpreted as the weight that player i puts on pure strategy s
i
j .
Here λ is a parameter of the extreme value distribution. Values of λ equal to zero mean
that strategies consists of all error, and errors disappear when λ tends to infinity.
Next, we can define the homotopy correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ → Σ by
H(t, σ ) =
∏
i∈N
{β i (t, σ )}, (t, σ ) ∈ [0, 1) × Σ, (4)
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Table 1 Algorithms described in this survey
Section Algorithm Homotopy # Players Technique
5 Lemke–Howson (1) 2 Complementary pivoting
6 van den Elzen–Talman (2) 2 Complementary pivoting
8 Herings–van den Elzen (3) n Simplicial
9 Herings–Peeters (3) n Predictor–corrector
10 McKelvey–Palfrey (4) n Predictor–corrector
where β i (t, σ ) is the best response function for an extreme value distribution with
parameter t/(1 − t), and
H(1, σ ) =
∏
i∈N
β i (σ ),
the product of best response correspondences in the game of interest Γ .
When t = 0, there is a unique fixed point. At the fixed point, each player chooses
each of his pure strategies with equal probability. Theorem 2 implies that this fixed
point is connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ .
4.5 Homotopy continuation
For bimatrix games, the homotopy path is piecewise linear. It is possible to generate
the homotopy path by a finite sequence of complementary pivoting steps. For general
n-person games, the homotopy path has to be traced numerically. There are two fun-
damental methods of doing so: simplicial methods and predictor–corrector methods.
Simplicial methods exactly follow approximate solution curves, whereas predictor–
corrector methods approximately follow exact solution curves. For a detailed over-
view on path-tracking methods the reader is referred to Garcia and Zangwill (1981)
and Allgower and Georg (1990).
The different algorithms mentioned throughout this section use different ways to
trace the path that is determined by the respective homotopy. Table 1 shows for each
of these algorithms the section in which it is explained in detail, the homotopy that is
followed, and the path-following method that is used.
5 Bimatrix games: the Lemke–Howson algorithm
Recall that the disjoint union of the pure strategies over all players is denoted by S,
and the cardinality of this set by m. Any mixed strategy σ i is assigned a set of labels
in S. In particular, σ i is labeled by the pure strategies that are played with probability
zero and the pure strategies of the opponent that are best responses to it:
L1(σ 1) = { s1j ∈ S1 | σ 1j = 0 } ∪ { s2j ∈ S2 | (A2• j )σ 1 ≥ (A2•k)σ 1 (s2k ∈ S2) },
L2(σ 2) = { s2j ∈ S2 | σ 2j = 0 } ∪ { s1j ∈ S1 | A1• j σ 2 ≥ A1•kσ 2 (s1k ∈ S1) }.
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A profile of mixed strategies σ = (σ 1, σ 2) is labeled by the union of the labels of σ 1
and σ 2:
L(σ ) = L1(σ 1) ∪ L2(σ 2).
A profile of mixed strategies σ is called completely labeled if L(σ ) = S and called
sij —almost completely labeled if L(σ ) ∪ {sij } = S. The following result can easily be
shown.
Theorem 3 A mixed strategy pair (σ 1, σ 2) ∈ Σ constitutes a Nash equilibrium of
the bimatrix game (A1, A2) if and only if it is completely labeled.
A bimatrix game with the property that any σ i ∈ Σ i has at most mi labels is called
nondegenerate. For the moment, we will restrict the analysis to the class of nonde-
generate games. The following result is stated in von Stengel (2002) as Theorem 2.7.
Theorem 4 In a nondegenerate bimatrix game (A1, A2) only finitely many points in
Σ1 have m1 labels and only finitely many points in Σ2 have m2 labels.
It follows as a consequence of this theorem that in a nondegenerate bimatrix game
there are finitely many points in Σ1 × Σ2 that have m1 + m2 labels. Consequently,
there are finitely many points that are completely labeled and hence finitely many
Nash equilibria.
Consider the homotopy as defined in (1). The strategy profile σ belongs to H(t, σ )
if and only if σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ (t). We argue next that if σ is a fixed
point, then L(σ ) ∪ {sij } = S, so σ is sij —almost completely labeled. Indeed, a pure
strategy unequal sij is either played with probability 0 or is a best response in Γ (t), so
certainly a best response in Γ (1). Conversely, if σ is sij —almost completely labeled,
then σ ∈ H(t, σ ) for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Also, σ is completely labeled if and only if
σ ∈ H(1, σ ).
The algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964) boils down to following the homoto-
py-path, i.e. following a path of sij —almost completely labeled strategy profiles. For
nondegenerate games, the set of points (t, σ ) for which σ ∈ H(t, σ ) consists of a finite
number of piecewise linear arcs and loops. Each arc has two endpoints, either both
being Nash equilibria of Γ , or one being a Nash equilibrium of Γ and the other of Γ (0).
The latter arc corresponds to the homotopy-path. Loops do not contain any Nash equi-
libria. It follows immediately that the number of Nash equilibria of a nondegenerate
game is odd.
In a nondegenerate game, player −i has a unique best response to sij , say s−ik . The
pure strategy profile (sij , s
−i
k ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of Γ (0), and is s
i
j —
almost completely labeled. Clearly, (sij , s
−i
k ) ∈ H(0, (sij , s−ik )), and for sufficiently
small values of t , (sij , s
−i
k ) ∈ H(t, (sij , s−ik )). Either (sij , s−ik ) is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ , and the homotopy-path equals the straight line-segment between (0, (sij , s
−i
k ))
and (1, (sij , s
−i




k ) is not a Nash equilibrium of Γ , and for some value of
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in game Γ (t ′). Following the homotopy-path now corresponds to generating a new
line-segment of points (t, σ ) with the property that σ i puts positive probability only
on sij and s
i
j ′ , both pure strategies are best responses in Γ (t) to s
−i
k , and s
−i
k is a best
response in Γ (t) to σ i . After a finite number of such steps, the algorithm terminates
with a Nash equilibrium of Γ as soon as the value t = 1 is reached.
The algebraic technique that generates the path of sij —almost complete strategy
profiles is known as complementary pivoting. As in linear programming, pivoting
refers to the change of a basis in a linear system of equations that describes a polyhe-
dron. Contrary to linear programming, the determination of the variable that enters the
basis is not determined by the improvement in the objective function, but by comple-
mentarity considerations. For a self-contained description of complementary pivoting,
we refer the reader to von Stengel (2002). We will illustrate the technique of com-
plementary pivoting in more detail in our exposition of the van den Elzen–Talman
algorithm.
We continue our explanation of the Lemke–Howson algorithm by following its
exposition in Shapley (1974). This exposition consists of a compact and elegant
description of the endpoints of each linear segment in the piecewise linear homot-
opy-path.
Consider a nondegenerate bimatrix game (A1, A2) and let Gi (for i = 1, 2) be
the undirected graph whose vertices are the points from Σ i with mi labels, and an
additional vertex 0i having all strategies of player i as label (Li (0i ) = Si ).1 Any two
vertices of Gi are joined by an edge if they have exactly mi − 1 labels in common
(and thus differ in one label precisely).
Let G = G1 × G2 be the product graph with the vertices being all pairs of vertices
of G1 and G2 and the edges being all vertex-edge pairs with vertices coming from G1
and edges from G2 or vice versa. In line with the definitions above, an edge of G is
called sij —almost completely labeled if the two vertices that are connected by it are
sij —almost completely labeled.
A first observation is that for every sij any completely labeled vertex (σ 1, σ 2) in G,
that is any Nash equilibrium and the additional vertex (01, 02), is adjacent to exactly
one sij —almost completely labeled vertex (σ˜ 1, σ˜ 2). If s
i
j is a label of σ 1, then σ 1
is adjacent to σ˜ 1 in G1 (sharing the same remaining m1 − 1 labels) and σ 2 = σ˜ 2.
If sij is a label of σ 2, then σ 2 is adjacent to σ˜ 2 in G2 (sharing the same remaining
m2 −1 labels) and σ 1 = σ˜ 1. A second observation is that any vertex (σ 1, σ 2) in G that
is sij —almost completely labeled but not completely labeled, is adjacent to exactly
two sij —almost completely labeled vertices in G. A vertex (σ 1, σ 2) in G can only be
sij —almost completely labeled if σ 1 and σ 2 both have one other label s
h
k in common.
One neighbor of (σ 1, σ 2) is (σ˜ 1, σ 2) with σ˜ 1 being adjacent to σ 1 by an shk —almost
completely labeled edge in G1. The other is (σ 1, σ˜ 2) with σ˜ 2 being adjacent to σ 2
1 Our explanation of the Lemke–Howson algorithm based on homotopies does not need the additional
vertex 0i . The strategy profile (sij , s
−i
k ) in our exposition can be used to replace the additional vertex.
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Fig. 1 Example
by an shk —almost completely labeled edge in G2. For the following result, see Lemke
and Howson (1964) or Shapley (1974).
Theorem 5 Let (A1, A2) be a nondegenerate bimatrix game and sij be a label in S.
Then the set of sij —almost completely labeled vertices and edges in G consists of
disjoint arcs and loops. The end-points of the arcs are the completely labeled vertices
(the equilibria of the game) and the completely labeled vertex (01, 02) (the artificial
equilibrium). The number of Nash equilibria of the game is odd.
The algorithm of Lemke–Howson starts in the artificial equilibrium (01, 02) that
has all labels. For given label sij a path consisting of s
i
j —almost completely labeled
edges and vertices is followed that terminates at a Nash equilibrium of the game. From
a computational point of view, moving from one almost completely labeled vertex pair
to another, is equivalent to making a linear programming pivot step. We will explain
this in more detail for the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm presented in Sect. 6.
Essentially, the Lemke–Howson algorithm terminates at an equilibrium because for
a given label s, the set of almost s—almost completely labeled edges is a graph where
every vertex has only one or two neighbors, so this is clearly a collection of paths and
cycles. The endpoints of the paths come in pairs and are the equilibria, including the
artificial equilibrium, so the number of non-artificial equilibria is odd. A vivid image is
the “haunted house”, which is a house with only one entry from the outside and where
every room has only one or two doors. By entering from the outside and subsequently
leaving each entered room via the second door of that room, one will eventually reach
a room with only one door only or continues ad infinitum. The latter cannot happen,
since it would imply that the first room visited for the second time has three doors.
The outside entrance corresponds to the artificial equilibrium, and the rooms with one
door to Nash equilibria of interest.
Consider the game of Fig. 1. This game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium: the
mixed strategy profile (σ¯ 1, σ¯ 2) = (( 23 , 13 ), ( 34 , 14 )).
Figure 2 contains the graphs G1 and G2 for this game. The vertices are indicated
by the (mixed) strategies, the labels by the pure strategies with quotation marks. The
path of s11—almost completely labeled vertices and edges connects the artificial equi-
librium (01, 02) via the vertices (s11 , 02), (s11 , s22 ), (σ¯ 1, s22 ) to the equilibrium (σ¯ 1, σ¯ 2).
Our exposition of Lemke–Howson using the homotopy approach would skip the two
artificial vertices (01, 02) and (s11 , 02), and starts directly with (s11 , s22 ).
In game theory degeneracy is not always a non-generic phenomenon. For instance,
for a normal form representation of a game in extensive form, degeneracy is the rule
rather than the exception, even if the payoffs in the extensive form game are randomly
chosen. But also in other normal form games, representing certain economic situa-
tions, degeneracy can easily occur, simply because payoffs are not randomly chosen
but reflect some structure that is present in the economic model. Lemke and Howson
(1964) resolve degeneracy by perturbing the game and show that an equilibrium for the
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Fig. 2 Graphical illustration of
the Lemke–Howson algorithm
corresponding to the game in
Fig. 1. The s11 -almost
completely labeled path is given
by steps i–iv
perturbed game defines an equilibrium for the original game. Wilson (1992) amends
the Lemke–Howson algorithm to handle degenerate games by using lexicographic
pivoting techniques. The resulting algorithm can be used to compute a set of simply
stable equilibria.2 We will illustrate the use of lexicographic pivoting techniques in
Sect. 8 when dealing with the Herings–van den Elzen algorithm.
The Lemke–Howson algorithm can be extended to the class of polymatrix games.
These are games where for each player the payoffs are additive over the bilateral inter-
actions with the other players. Complementary pivoting has been applied to polym-
atrix games by Yanovskaya (1986), Howson (1972), Eaves (1973), and Howson and
Rosenthal (1974).
6 Bimatrix games: the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm
The Lemke–Howson algorithm always starts in a pure strategy profile, where for one
player a pure strategy is randomly chosen, and the other player uses a best response.
van den Elzen and Talman (1991) developed an algorithm similar to the Lemke–
Howson algorithm that allows for an arbitrary mixed strategy profile as the starting
point. In von Stengel et al. (2002) it has been shown that the van den Elzen–Talman
algorithm is equivalent to Lemke’s algorithm (Lemke 1965) for a specific auxiliary
vector.
The advantage of an arbitrary starting point is twofold. First, often some reasonable
guess of the pure strategies that should be played in an equilibrium is available. Then
it is natural to take as a starting point of the algorithm a strategy that puts only weight
on such strategies. Secondly, if there is an interest in detecting whether a given game
has multiple Nash equilibria, or there is a desire to compute several Nash equilibria if
there exist multiple ones, the flexibility of the starting point is a desirable feature. We
would like to stress that the analysis that follows can be adapted in a straightforward
way to the Lemke–Howson algorithm.
A subset B of S is called admissible if B ∩ Si = ∅ for all i ∈ N , so an admissible
subset B of S contains at least one pure strategy for each player. We would like to warn
the reader that our use of admissible subset is unrelated to the concept of admissible
strategy, which in game theory means a strategy that is not weakly dominated.
2 A set of equilibria is called stable if every game nearby has equilibria nearby. Simple stability results
if the perturbations are not arbitrary but are restricted to certain systematic ways that are easily captured
computationally.
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Let a starting point ν ∈ Σ be given. Then σ ∈ H(t, σ ) for the homotopy defined
in (2) if and only if there is an admissible subset B of S and vectors τ i , λi ∈ Rmi+ , and
µi ∈ R such that
σ ij = (1 − t)νij + τ ij (sij ∈ S)
ui (σ−i , sij ) + λij = µi (sij ∈ S)
∑
sij ∈Si
τ ij = t (i ∈ N )
τ ij = 0 (sij ∈ B)
λij = 0 (sij ∈ B).
(5)
Suppose (t, σ, τ, λ, µ) is a solution to (5) (notice that not all B admit solutions in
general). The variable µi represents the maximum payoff that player i can get against
strategy σ−i . The pure strategies in B are all best responses. The λij ’s corresponding
to best responses are therefore equal to zero. For strategies not in B, the corresponding
variable τ ij is equal to zero.
For bimatrix games the system above is linear and the second line of it can be
replaced by
A1j •σ 2 + λ1j = µ1 (s1j ∈ S1)
(σ 1) A2• j + λ2j = µ2 (s2j ∈ S2).
By substitution of the first line of (5) into these new equations we end up with the
following system of 2(m1+m2+1) linear equations and 2(m1+m2+1)+1 variables:





k ) + λ1j = µ1 (s1j ∈ S1)
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A2• j + λ2j = µ2 (s2j ∈ S2)
∑
sij ∈Si
τ ij = t (i ∈ N )
τ ij = 0 (sij ∈ B)
λij = 0 (sij ∈ B).
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Given the number of equations and unknowns, for each admissible set B a one-dimen-
sional solution set is what one expects. Slightly strengthening the definition of van
den Elzen and Talman (1991), we define a bimatrix game to be nondegenerate if at
each solution (t, σ, τ, λ, µ) of (6) at most one of the constraints 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, λ1j ≥ 0
for s1j ∈ B, λ2j ≥ 0 for s2j ∈ B, τ 1j ≥ 0 fors1j ∈ B, and τ 2j ≥ 0 for s2j ∈ B, is binding.
This implies that for each B the set of solutions to the corresponding system is an
empty set or a compact line segment.
Let B be the set containing for each player i his best response against ν−i . For non-
degenerate games, this best response, and thereby B, is uniquely defined. It is easily
verified that t = 0, τ = 0, µi = ui (ν−i , sij ) for sij ∈ B and λij = µi − ui (ν−i , sij ),
sij ∈ S, is a solution to (6). Notice that λij is strictly positive for sij ∈ B and τ ij is
strictly positive for sij ∈ B.
The idea is to keep B fixed and to increase t until one of the constraints would get
violated, i.e. one of the λ’s or τ ’s would become negative. Since the set of solutions is
a line segment, increasing t leads from the solution just identified, to the other bound-
ary point of the line segment. From a computational point of view, the operation just
described corresponds to a linear programming pivot step.
If the other boundary point of the line segment corresponds to t = 1, the algorithm
stops. It is easily verified that a solution to (6) with t = 1 yields a Nash equilibrium of
the bimatrix game Γ . Otherwise, we have to adapt the set B such that the procedure
can be continued. For the first line segment generated, the case where τ ij becomes neg-
ative for some sij ∈ B cannot occur. The end-point of the line segment is characterized
by λij = 0 for some sij ∈ B. In this case sij is added to the set B and the system of
equations (6) is studied for B ∪{sij }. The end-point of the previous line segment is the
starting point of the line segment of solutions to (6) for B ∪{sij }. The end-point of this
line segment satisfies either t = 1, in which case a Nash equilibrium has been found,
or τ i
′
j ′ = 0 for some si
′
j ′ ∈ B ∪ {sij }, in which case a new admissible set is defined as
B ∪{sij }\{si
′
j ′ }, or λi
′
j ′ = 0 for some si
′
j ′ ∈ B ∪{sij }, and a new admissible set is defined
as B ∪ {sij } ∪ {si
′
j ′ }.
The procedure stops when t is equal to 1. The door-in door-out principle of Lemke
and Howson guarantees that such will be the case after generating a finite number of
admissible sets B. Hence starting from a solution corresponding to (t, σ ) = (0, ν)
by linear programming steps a piecewise linear path towards a Nash equilibrium is
followed.
Theorem 6 Let the bimatrix game (A1, A2) and the starting point ν be nonde-
generate. Then the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm terminates with a Nash equi-
librium.
Figure 3 displays the projection on Σ of the path for the game of Fig. 1 for initial
starting profile ν = (( 45 , 15 ), ( 25 , 35 )). For player 1 and 2, the pure strategies s12 and s22
are the best responses against the initial strategy profile ν. Therefore we start tracking
the solutions to the system in (6) for B = {s12 , s22 } starting at t = 0. We can increase t








3 )), and λ
2
1 becomes 0. This
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Fig. 3 Example van den
Elzen–Talman
means that at t = 16 the pure strategy s21 has become a best response for player 2 and
we should continue tracking the system determined by B extended with s21 . In the new
system for B = {s12 , s21 , s22 } we can keep t at 16 and increase τ 21 until τ 22 becomes 0 and
strategy s22 should be eliminated from the admissible subset B. The strategy profile
reached equals σ = (( 23 , 13 ), ( 12 , 12 )). The next system to solve is therefore determined
by B = {s12 , s21 } and we move in the direction of (s12 , s21 ) by increasing t , τ 12 , and
τ 21 . At t = 712 , σ = (( 13 , 23 ), ( 34 , 14 )), λ11 becomes 0 and s11 should be included in B:
B = {s11 , s12 , s21 }. Next the path stays at t = 712 and τ 11 is increased. We can increase
τ 11 until τ
1
1 = 13 (and τ 12 = 14 ) when λ11 gets 0. The strategy profile σ reached equals
σ¯ = (( 13 , 23 ), ( 34 , 14 )), the Nash equilibrium of the game. We complete the algorithm
by following the path for B = {s11 , s12 , s21 , s22 } keeping σ at the equilibrium value σ¯ ,
towards t = 1.
The procedure tracks a piecewise linear path starting at (0, ν) = (0, (( 45 , 15 ), ( 25 ,
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4 ))), and reaching t = 1 with the Nash equilibrium at (1, σ¯ ) =






4 ))). Clearly, we could have terminated the algorithm at t = 712
when we found the Nash equilibrium. More generally, as soon as a set B = S is
reached, a fully mixed Nash equilibrium has been found, and the algorithm can be
stopped.
In van den Elzen and Talman (1999) it is shown that given any prior and a generic
bimatrix game, the paths generated by the linear tracing procedure developed in
Harsanyi (1975) and the pivoting procedure outlined above are the same. The trac-
ing procedure is the key ingredient in the equilibrium selection method developed in
Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We will explain the linear tracing procedure in more detail
in Sect. 8.
7 From two to many players
The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a game with more than two players
is equivalent to solving a non-linear complementarity problem. Therefore, comple-
mentary pivoting techniques are not directly applicable. For general n-person games,
algorithms to compute equilibria rely either on simplicial subdivisions for approxi-
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mating nonlinear homotopies by piecewise linear ones, or on numerical methods to
solve systems of higher-degree polynomial inequalities. Methods for the computation
of equilibria for noncooperative games with more than two players are also surveyed
in McKelvey and McLennan (1996).
Seminal papers on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games are
the ones by Rosenmüller (1971) and Wilson (1971). Both extend the Lemke–
Howson procedure to nondegerenerate n-person games by formulating the prob-
lem of finding a Nash equilibrium as a nonlinear complementarity problem. Both
procedures start with fixing a strategy for (n − 1) players and compute the best
response against it for the remaining player. The point found determines a starting
point for the 2-person game that results after unfixing one of the players from its
strategy from which a path towards an equilibrium of this 2-person game originates.
This equilibrium determines the starting point for the next step in the procedure.
The procedures of Rosenmüller and Wilson construct in this way an equilibrium of
an n-person game by successively constructing equilibria of k-person games, where
1 ≤ k ≤ n.
The problem of this procedure is that the paths are no longer linear. To turn this
procedure into a numerical algorithm, a method is needed to follow the non-linear
path. Although the methods of Rosenmüller and Wilson are not directly suitable for
computational purposes, their common result, the existence of a non-linear path lead-
ing to an equilibrium, was a very important step towards an implementable algorithm
as developed by Garcia et al. (1973) and van der Laan et al. (1987).
A problem of the algorithms discussed so far in this section is that they calcu-
late only an approximation of a sample Nash equilibrium. McLennan (2005) shows
that the number of Nash equilibria in normal form games of modest size is huge on
average. For instance, the mean number of Nash equilibria in a game with 4 agents,
each having 6 strategies, is estimated to be 2,037. This number increases rapidly
in the number of players and the number of strategies. The huge number of Nash
equilibria of a typical game calls for the development of a theory of equilibrium selec-
tion.
Two methods of equilibrium selection stand out in the game-theoretic literature.
The first one is the equilibrium selection theory developed in Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), which applies to general n-person games. The Herings–van den Elzen and
Herings–Peeters algorithms compute the Nash equilibrium that is selected by the
linear tracing procedure—an important construct in this selection theory. The first
of these algorithms relies on simplicial approximations and is explained in detail in
Sect. 8. The other algorithm uses tools from differential topology and is presented in
Sect. 9.
The second method of equilibrium selection is the quantal response equilibrium
of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). The quantal response equilibrium is often applied
by experimentalists because of its good prediction of human behavior. It incorpo-
rates probabilities of making mistakes into the Nash equilibrium concept. Quantal
response equilibrium can be turned into a theory of equilibrium selection by selecting
the equilibrium that is obtained in the limit when mistake probabilities go to zero. This
method relies like the Herings–Peeters algorithm on differentiability and is presented
in Sect. 10.
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8 n-Person games: the Herings–van den Elzen algorithm
8.1 The linear tracing procedure
The linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi (1975) starts from a prior, reflecting the
ideas of any player about the strategy used by the other player, and next players react
optimally thereupon. Then the players observe that their expectations are not met and
adjust them towards observed behavior and again react thereupon. By simultaneously
and gradually adjusting expectations, and reacting optimally against these revised
expectations, eventually an equilibrium is reached.
Consider some n-person game Γ and some prior p ∈ Σ and denote, for every
t ∈ [0, 1], Γ (t) as the game 〈N , {Si }i∈N , {vi (t)}i∈N 〉, where the payoff function
vi (t) : Σ → R of player i is defined by
vi (t, σ ) = tui (σ ) + (1 − t)ui (p−i , σ i ).
The game Γ (0) corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that their
opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The game Γ (1) coin-
cides with the original game Γ . A best response against a strategy combination σ ∈ Σ
in the game Γ (t) corresponds to a best response against the probability distribution
t[σ ]+(1− t)[p] on S in the game Γ . The latter probability distribution does in general
not belong to Σ , since it may be correlated when there are more than two players.
The set of all Nash equilibria related to the games Γ (t), t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L(Γ, p) =
{
(t, σ ) ∈ [0, 1] × Σ
∣
∣
∣ σ ∈ NE(Γ (t))
}
.
Observe that σ ∈ H(t, σ ) for the homotopy (3) if and only if (t, σ ) ∈ L(Γ, p).
Once the number of pure strategies of each player is fixed, a noncooperative game
is completely determined by the utility functions u, which can be represented by a
vector in Rm∗·n , where m∗ equals the product over i of mi . The standard topology and
measure on Rm
∗·n therefore induce a topology and a measure on games. The set of
such games is denoted G. For the following result, see Schanuel et al. (1991), Herings
(2000), and Herings and Peeters (2001).
Theorem 7 There exists a path in L(Γ, p) connecting a best response against the
prior to a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ . For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and
priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure, this path is unique.
The first of part of Theorem 7 follows from an immediate application of Theorem 2.
We refer the reader to Sect. 9 for details on the proof of the second part of Theorem 7.
The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (0) to a Nash
equilibrium of Γ (1). That is, the linear tracing procedure traces the generically unique
path in L(Γ, p). The interpretation of the linear tracing procedure is that players grad-
ually adjust their beliefs about the behavior of their opponents by gradually putting
less weight to the initial beliefs, the prior.
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Recall that a subset B of S is said to be admissible if B ∩ Si = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
Admissible subsets B can be used to decompose L(Γ, p) in subsets L(Γ, p, B), where
a set L(Γ, p, B) contains those elements of L(Γ, p) where only strategies in B are
played with positive probability. The manifold structure of L(Γ, p, B) is analyzed in
detail in Sect. 9. The set Σ(B) = {σ ∈ Σ | ∀sij ∈ B, σ ij = 0} is the strategy set con-
sistent with B. The set Λ(B) = {λ ∈ Rm+ | ∀sij ∈ B, λij = 0} is the set of Lagrange
multipliers associated to B. A point (t, σ ) ∈ [0, 1] × Σ(B) belongs to L(Γ, p, B) if
and only if there exists λ ∈ Λ(B) and µ ∈ Rn such that
vi (t, σ− j , sij ) + λij − µi = 0 (sij ∈ S). (7)
We denote by v the function with components vi (t, σ− j , sij ) for s
i
j ∈ S. The next step
is to turn Theorem 7 and Eq. (7) into an implementable algorithm.
In Herings and van den Elzen (2002) a simplicial algorithm is used to generate a
piecewise linear path that approximates L(Γ, p). For every B, they define a piece-
wise linear approximation of (7), whose solution approximates L(Γ, p, B). Next it
is shown that the piecewise linear solutions paths for varying B can be nicely fitted
together, and result in a piecewise linear path from a solution to the starting problem
to an approximate Nash equilibrium of the terminal problem.
8.2 Piecewise linear approximations
This subsection describes how to construct piecewise linear approximations to the
function v.
For k ∈ N, a k-dimensional simplex or k-simplex ς in Rd is defined as the
convex hull of k + 1 affinely independent points x1, . . . , xk+1 of Rd . We write
ς = ς(x1, . . . , xk+1) and call x1, . . . , xk+1 the vertices of ς . A (k − 1)-simplex
that is the convex hull of k vertices of ς(x1, . . . , xk+1) is said to be a facet of ς . The
facet τ(x1, . . . , x j−1, x j+1, . . . , xk+1) is called the facet of ς opposite to the vertex
x j . For a non-negative integer k′ less than or equal to k, a k′-simplex that is the convex
hull of k′ + 1 vertices of ς is said to be a k′-face of ς .
A finite collection S of k-simplices is a triangulation of a k-dimensional convex
subset T of Rd if (1) T is the union of all simplices in S and (2) the intersection of
any two simplices in S is either empty or a common face of both. If S is a triangu-
lation of T , and a facet τ of ς1 ∈ S is a subset of the relative boundary of T , then
there is no ς2 ∈ S such that ς2 = ς1 and τ is a facet of ς2. If τ is not a subset
of the relative boundary of T , then there is exactly one ς2 ∈ Σ such that ς2 = ς1
and τ is also a facet of ς2. The mesh size of a triangulation S of T is defined by
mesh(S) = max{‖x − y‖∞ | x, y ∈ ς , ς ∈ S}.
It is well-known that full-dimensional affine parts of the relative boundary of a set
are triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation. More precisely, let
S be a triangulation of a convex k-dimensional subset T of Rd , and let the (k − 1)-
dimensional subset T¯ of the relative boundary of T be such that T¯ is equal to the affine
hull of T¯ intersected with T . Then the collection S¯ given by S¯ = {τ ⊂ T¯ | ∃ς ∈ S, τ
is a facet of ς} is a triangulation of T¯ (see Todd (1976), Theorem 2.3). For instance,
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Fig. 4 A triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ . Only 3-simplices in co(x¯3, x¯5, x¯6, x¯12, x¯14, x¯15) are depicted. The
vertex x¯1 = (0, (1, 0), (1, 0)) refers to the strategy vector at which both players play their first pure strat-
egy. Similarly, x¯3, x¯7, and x¯9 correspond to (0, (0, 1), (1, 0)), (0, (1, 0), (0, 1)), and (0, (0, 1), (0, 1)),
respectively
Table 2 All full-dimensional simplices in [0, 12 ] × S
co(x¯4, x¯7, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯7, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯9, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯9, x¯5, x¯14)
co(x¯4, x¯7, x¯16, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯7, x¯16, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯9, x¯18, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯9, x¯18, x¯14)
co(x¯4, x¯13, x¯16, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯17, x¯16, x¯14) co(x¯8, x¯17, x¯18, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯15, x¯18, x¯14)
co(x¯4, x¯1, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯1, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯3, x¯5, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯3, x¯5, x¯14)
co(x¯4, x¯1, x¯10, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯1, x¯10, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯3, x¯12, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯3, x¯12, x¯14)
co(x¯4, x¯13, x¯10, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯11, x¯10, x¯14) co(x¯2, x¯11, x¯12, x¯14) co(x¯6, x¯15, x¯12, x¯14)
the set {0} × Σ is triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation of
[0, 1] × Σ .
An example of a triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ is illustrated in Fig. 4 for the case
we have two players each having two pure strategies. For later purposes we give
all 3-simplices in the triangulation of Fig. 4 in Table 2. In Table 2 only the
3-simplices in [0, 12 ] × Σ are given. The ones in [ 12 , 1] × Σ follow by means of
a translation. The position in the table is related to the position of a simplex in the
triangulation.
A function v¯ : [0, 1] × Σ → Rn is called the piecewise linear approximation of v
with respect to S if for each vertex xk of any ς(x1, . . . , xm−n+2) ∈ S, v¯(xk) = v(xk)
and v¯ is affine on each simplex of S. Hence, if x belongs to ς(x1, . . . , xm−n+2), that
is x = ∑m−n+2k=1 αk xk where αk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , m − n + 2 and
∑m−n+2
k=1 αk = 1,
then v¯(x) = ∑m−n+2k=1 αk v¯(xk).
Let an admissible subset B and a triangulation S of [0, 1]×Σ be given. We denote
by S(B) the collection of b-faces of simplices in Σ that are contained in [0, 1]×Σ(B),
where b = |B| + 1 − n with |B| the cardinality of B. By repeated application of the
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result that claims that the relative boundary of a set is triangulated by the facets of a
triangulation, it follows that S(B) is a triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ(B).
Let a simplex ς(x1, . . . , xb+1) ∈ S(B) be given. Consider solutions (α, λ, µ) in
R
b+1+ × Λ(B) × Rn of the following system of equations, a piecewise linear approx-













j − µi ei = 0i (i ∈ N ),
where we observe that v¯i (xk) = vi (xk). Such solutions are called admissible. An
admissible solution (α, λ, µ) to (8) corresponds to an approximate Nash equilibrium
σ of Γ (t), where (t, σ) = ∑b+1k=1 αk xk . Indeed, strategies in B are best replies for
the payoff function v¯, λij is the payoff gap between strategy s
i
j and a best reply for
player i , and µi is the payoff for player i according to v¯ when he uses a best reply.
Since ς ⊂ [0, 1] × Σ(B), strategies that are not a best reply are played with proba-
bility zero. An admissible solution to (8) is said to be degenerate if at least two of the
variables αk , k = 1, . . . , b + 1, and λij , sij ∈ B, are equal to zero.
8.3 Complete facets
The Herings–van den Elzen algorithm generates by means of lexicographic pivoting
techniques a piecewise linear path of approximate Nash equilibria in [0, 1]×Σ joining
{0}×Σ to {1}×Σ . The path is such that every (t, σ ) on it corresponds to an admissible
B, a simplex ς ∈ S(B), and an admissible solution (α, λ, µ). The Herings–van den
Elzen algorithm specifies in a unique way how to move from one simplex to another.
For given (B, ς), (8) corresponds to a linear system with m + 1 equations and
m + 2 variables. If we rule out degeneracies, then a non-empty solution set is a one-
dimensional compact line segment. The end-points of the line segment are either
approximate Nash equilibria for Γ (0) or Γ (1), or yield admissible solutions for a new
(B¯, ς¯ ). Indeed, with degeneracies ruled out, at an end-point either αk = 0 for exactly
one k or λij = 0 for exactly one sij ∈ B. In the first case, the end-point belongs to the
facet τ of ς opposite to the vertex xk . If τ does not belong to the relative boundary
of [0, 1] × Σ(B), then there is a unique simplex ς¯ ∈ S(B) such that ς¯ = ς , and τ
is a facet of ς¯ . The algorithm continues by generating a line-segment of admissible
solutions in ς¯ . If τ belongs to the relative boundary of [0, 1] × Σ(B), then the end-
point is either an approximate Nash equilibrium for Γ (0), or an approximate Nash
equilibrium for Γ (1), or τ ∈ S(B¯), with B¯ a uniquely determined subset of B hav-
ing one element less, and the algorithm continues with a line-segment of admissible
solutions in τ . If λij = 0, then also strategy sij is a best reply. The algorithm continues
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with a line-segment of admissible solutions in ς¯ , where ς¯ is the unique simplex in
S(B ∪ {sij }) having ς as a facet.
We have argued in Sect. 5 that degeneracy is not always a non-generic phenomenon
in game theory. Degeneracy can be dealt with by exploiting lexicographic pivoting
techniques. We explain next how lexicographic pivoting techniques can be used to
extend the ideas of the previous paragraph to handle degenerate games.
For an admissible B and a facet τ(x1, . . . , xb) of a simplex in S(B), the (m + 1)×









1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
E1 0 −e1 0
v¯(x1) · · · v¯(xb) 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0









where, for i ∈ N , Ei = [eij ]sij ∈B, and the zeros indicate submatrices of appropriate
dimension with zeros only. The matrix AB,τ corresponds to the coefficients in (8) when
a facet τ of a simplex ς is considered. Suppose A−1B,τ exists. From AB,τ A
−1
B,τ = I m+1
(the (m +1)-dimensional identity matrix), it follows that the first column of A−1B,τ cor-
responds to an admissible solution to (8) for any ς ∈ S(B) being the convex hull of τ
and some vertex xb+1 ∈ [0, 1] × Σ(B), whenever the first m + 1 − n components of
this column are non-negative. No restrictions are imposed on the last n rows of A−1B,τ .
In a nondegenerate solution the first m + 1 − n components are all strictly positive,
since αb+1 = 0 extends the admissible solution for the facet τ to the simplex ς .
A row vector x ∈ Rm+1 is lexicographically positive if it is not equal to the vec-
tor of zeroes and its first non-zero entry is positive. The matrix A−1B,τ is said to be
semi-lexicopositive if each of the first m + 1 − n rows is lexicographically positive.
Given a linear system of equations as in (8), one can pivot in a uniquely determined
new column, either of the type (1, v¯(xb+1)) or of the type (0, 0, eij , 0). In the nonde-
generate case such a pivot step determines in a unique way a column out of the first
m + 1 − n to be replaced. In degenerate cases it is possible that the leaving column
is not uniquely determined. A semi-lexicographic pivot step is a pivot step where the
leaving column is selected in such a way that the inverse of the resulting matrix AB,τ is
semi-lexicopositive. Herings and van den Elzen (2002) show that a semi-lexicographic
pivot step determines in all cases a unique column out of the first m + 1 − n to be
replaced.
A facet τ of a simplex in S(B) is B-complete if A−1B,τ exists and is semi-lexicopos-
itive. Theorem 8 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B-complete facet τ is
given and a semi-lexicographic pivot step with a vector (1, v¯(xb+1)) is made, where
xb+1 is a vertex of a simplex having τ as the facet opposite to it.
Theorem 8 Let (Γ, p,S) and a B-complete facet τ of a simplex ς ∈ S(B) be given.
Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
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1. ς has exactly one other B-complete facet τ¯ ,
2. ς is B¯-complete for precisely one admissible B¯.
Theorem 9 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B-complete facet τ is
given that is also a simplex belonging to S(B¯), where B = B¯ ∪ {sij }, and a semi-
lexicographic pivot step with a vector (0, 0, eij , 0) is made.
Theorem 9 Let (Γ, p,S) and a B-complete facet τ that belongs to S(B¯) for some
admissible B¯ be given. Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. τ is B̂-complete for precisely one admissible B̂ with B̂ = B,
2. precisely one facet υ of τ is B¯-complete.
The consideration of B-complete facets determines a unique starting point for the
algorithm. The admissible subset B0 is defined by the set of strategies sij , where j is
the largest integer such that sij is a best reply to the prior p for player i . Notice that
|B0| = n. It can be shown that the facet (vertex) τ = {0} × Σ(B0) is B0-complete
and that there is no other B-complete facet τ in {0} × Σ . Even in degenerate cases,
the semi-lexicographic rules single out the unique B0-complete facet {0} × Σ(B0),
which serves as a unique starting point of the algorithm.
Notice that we are now in a position that makes the Lemke–Howson door-in door-
out principle applicable. There is a unique starting point in {0} ×Σ , the B0-complete
facet {0}×Σ(B0). For any B-complete facet τ of a simplex in S(B), Theorems 8 and
9 determine another complete facet in a unique way. The finiteness of the number of
simplices guarantees that at some stage a facet that is a subset of {1} × Σ is reached.
Such a facet determines an approximate Nash equilibrium.
8.4 The algorithm
The formal steps of the Herings–van den Elzen algorithm are as follows. In the descrip-
tion of the algorithm the r -th B-complete facet generated by the algorithm is denoted
by τ r , r = 1, 2, . . .
Algorithm Let (Γ, p,S) be given.
Step 0. Let b = 1 and r = 1. Let B = B0, τ 1 = {0} × Σ(B), and let x2 be the
unique vertex of the 1-simplex of S(B) containing τ 1 as the facet opposite
to it.
Step 1. Let ς be equal to the convex hull of τ r and {xb+1}. Make a semi-lexicographic
pivot step with (1, v¯(xb+1)) into the system of equations (8) corresponding
to AB,τ r , yielding a unique column k′ of AB,τ r which has to be replaced. If
k′ ∈ {b + 1, . . . , m + 1 − n}, then go to Step 3 with si ′j ′ the pure strategy
corresponding to column k′. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Increase the value of r by 1 and let τ r be the facet of ς opposite xk′ . If
τ r ⊂ {1}×Σ , then the algorithm terminates with an approximate Nash equi-
librium σ¯ of Γ (1) induced by the admissible solution of (8) corresponding
to AB,τ r . If τ r ∈ S(B¯) for some admissible B¯, then go to Step 4. Otherwise,
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there is exactly one b-simplex ς¯ of S(B) such that ς¯ = ς and τ r is a facet
of ς¯ . Go to Step 1 with xb+1 as the unique vertex of ς¯ opposite τ r .
Step 3. Let the admissible set B¯ be defined by B¯ = B ∪ {si ′j ′ }. There is a unique
simplex ς¯ of S(B¯) having ς as a facet. Increase the value of both b and r by
1 and go to Step 1 with xb+1 as the unique vertex of ς¯ opposite ς , B = B¯,
and τ r = ς .
Step 4. Let ς be equal to τ r . Make a semi-lexicographic pivot step with (0, 0, ei ′j ′ , 0)
into the system of Equations (8) corresponding to AB,τ r , where si ′j ′ is such
that B¯ ∪ {si ′j ′ } = B. This yields a unique column k′ of AB,τ r which has to
be replaced. If k′ ∈ {b + 1, . . . , m + 1 − n}, then decrease the value of both
b and r by 1 and go to Step 3 with si ′j ′ the pure strategy corresponding to
column k′ and B = B¯. Otherwise, decrease the value of b by 1 and go to
Step 2 with B = B¯.
Theorem 8 corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step made in Step 1: Case 1
occurs if one goes from Step 1 to Step 2, and Case 2 if one goes from Step 1 to
Step 3. Theorem 9 corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step performed in
Step 4: Case 1 happens if one goes from Step 4 to Step 3, and Case 2 if one goes from
Step 4 to Step 2. The algorithm terminates after a finite number of steps, after having
generated a B-complete facet τ being a subset of {1} × Σ(B).
Because we are dealing with a non-linear system of equations, we have to study
approximations of Nash equilibria. Our ultimate aim is to compute an ε-Nash equilib-
rium of Γ with ε an arbitrarily chosen positive number. For ε ≥ 0, a mixed strategy
combination σ ∈ Σ is called an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γ if, for every i ∈ N , σ ik > 0
implies ui (σ−i , sik) ≥ maxsij ∈Si u
i (σ−i , sij ) − ε. In an ε-Nash equilibrium the loss in
payoffs of using a suboptimal strategy is at most ε. Though the suboptimal strategy
itself might be far away from an optimal strategy, the loss in payoff is small, which
makes sense from a game-theoretic standpoint.
The algorithm generates a piecewise linear approximation of the homotopy path
generated by the linear tracing procedure. For every ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that a
triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ with mesh size smaller than δ makes the piecewise linear
approximation generated by the Herings–van den Elzen algorithm within ε-Hausdorff
distance from the homotopy path generated by the tracing procedure and hence the
algorithm terminates with an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γ . If the latter path is unique,
and a sequence of triangulations with decreasing mesh size is taken, then the gener-
ated piecewise linear approximations converge to the tracing procedure path in the
Hausdorff topology. As a consequence, the induced sequence of ε-Nash equilibria
converges to the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure.
8.5 An example
In Fig. 5 the algorithm is illustrated for the game considered before. The prior p is






4 )). Since p
2 is part of the Nash equilibrium, both pure strat-
egies of player 1 are best responses, and this game is degenerate both in the sense of
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Fig. 5 The Herings–van den Elzen algorithm in action
van den Elzen–Talman and in the sense of Herings–van den Elzen. We have chosen
this prior to illustrate that lexicographic pivoting techniques overcome degeneracies.
Since the game is a bimatrix game, we would in general recommend to use either the
Lemke–Howson or the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm, rather than the Herings–van
den Elzen algorithm.
In the example the algorithm generates 13 facets before terminating with an
approximate Nash equilibrium. The facet τ 1 is zero-dimensional, the facets τ 2, . . . , τ 7
are one-dimensional, and the facets τ 8, . . . , τ 13 are two-dimensional. The two-dimen-
sional facets are shaded in Fig. 5. The path generated by the algorithm is illustrated
by the heavily drawn line going from τ 1 to τ 13. The dotted line represents L(Γ, p),
which for this example consists of one component. It can be decomposed into six sets
L(Γ, p, B).
9 n-Person games: the Herings–Peeters algorithm
9.1 Some tools from differential topology
Games with n players possess a nice piecewise differentiable structure that can be
exploited for computational purposes. To prove Theorem 12, the theory of regular
constraint sets as presented in Jongen et al. (1983) can be applied, see also Herings
(1997) for a first application of this theory to economics.
For some r ≥ 1 a subset M of Rd is called a k-dimensional Cr manifold with
generalized boundary (MGB), if for every x¯ ∈ M there exists a Cr diffeomorphism
ϕ : U → V , where U is an open subset of Rd containing x¯ and V is open in Rd , and
some integer (x¯) ≥ 0, such that ϕ(x¯) = 0 and ϕ(U ∩ M) equals {y ∈ V | yl = 0, l =
1, . . . , d − k, and yl ≥ 0, l = d − k + 1, . . . , d − k + (x¯)}. If for every element x¯
of an MGB M it holds that (x¯) ≤ 1, then M is called a manifold with boundary and
the set of elements x¯ for which (x¯) = 1 is an (k − 1)-dimensional manifold, called
the boundary of M . One way to show that a set is an MGB is by showing that it is a
regular constraint set, a concept introduced next.
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Let K 1 and K 2 be two finite index sets and let gk for all k ∈ K 1 and hk for all
k ∈ K 2, be Cr functions defined on some open subset X of Rd . We define
M[g, h] =
{
x ∈ X ∣∣ gk(x) = 0, ∀k ∈ K 1, and hk(x) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K 2
}
.











∣ k ∈ K 0(x¯)
}
(9)
is a set of linearly independent vectors, then M[g, h] is called a Cr regular constraint
set (RCS). In Jongen et al. (1983) it is shown that every Cr RCS is an (d − |K 1|)-
dimensional Cr MGB with (x¯) = |K 0(x¯)| for every x¯ ∈ M[g, h]. If a set is a
k-dimensional manifold with generalized boundary, then the neighborhood of a point
x¯ belonging to that set looks, in a well-defined sense, like Rk−(x¯) × R(x¯)+ .
Let C1 manifolds X , Y , and Z , Z being a subset of Y , an element x¯ of X , and a
function f ∈ C1(X, Y ) be given. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally
at x¯ ∈ X , denoted by f  Z at x¯ , if
f (x¯) ∈ Z , or f (x¯) ∈ Z and T f (x¯)Z + ∂ f (x¯)(Tx¯ X) = T f (x¯)Y,
where Tx¯ X denotes the tangent space of X at x¯ . For regular constraint sets, the tangent
space of X at x¯ is easily computed as
Tx¯ X = {x ∈ Rd | ∂g(x¯)(x) = 0},
where 0 is an (d − k)-dimensional vector of zeroes with k being the dimension of the
tangent space. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally if f  Z at every
x ∈ X . Transversality of f implies that the inverse image of f has a particularly nice
structure.
Theorem 10 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ {0} ∪ N and r ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let a k1-dimensional Cr
manifold X, a k2-dimensional Cr manifold Y , and a k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z,
Z being a subset of Y , be given. Moreover, let f ∈ Cr (X, Y ) be a function such that
f  Z. If k1−k2+k3 ≥ 0, then f −1(Z) is a (k1−k2+k3)-dimensional Cr manifold.
If k1 − k2 + k3 < 0, then f −1(Z) = ∅.
We are now in a position to state the transversality theorem [see, for instance,
Mas-Colell (1985)].
Theorem 11 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ {0} ∪ N and r ∈ N ∪ {∞} with r ≥ max({1, k1 −
k2 + k3}), let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X, a k2-dimensional Cr manifold Y , a
k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z, Z being a subset of Y , be given. Moreover, let a Cr
manifold Ω and a function f ∈ Cr (X × Ω, Y ) be given. For every ω ∈ Ω , define
a function f ω ∈ Cr (X, Y ) by f ω(x) = f (x, ω), ∀x ∈ X. Then f  Z implies
f ω  Z, except for a subset of Ω having Lebesgue measure zero in Ω .
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9.2 The manifold structure of the linear tracing procedure
The Herings–Peeters algorithm exploits the manifold structure of the sets L(Γ, p, B).
They prove the following result.
Theorem 12 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue
measure, for all admissible subsets B of S, the set L(Γ, p, B) is a compact one-
dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary. Moreover, (t, σ ) is a boundary point of
L(Γ, p, B) if and only if either σ ij = 0 for exactly one sij ∈ B, or exactly one sij ∈ B
is a best response to σ−i , or t = 0, or t = 1.
A compact one-dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary consists of finitely many
arcs and loops. Theorem 12 therefore guarantees that generically L(Γ, p, B) has a
simple mathematical structure, excluding bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional
parts, etc. Theorem 12 is the non-linear equivalent of the compact line segments of
the Lemke–Howson, van den Elzen–Talman, and van den Elzen–Herings algorithms.
One difference now is that loops are possible and, moreover, L(Γ, p, B) may contain
more than one arc or loop.
We can show L(Γ, p, B) to be a C∞ one-dimensional manifold with boundary, if
we can represent it as a C∞ regular constraint set with index sets K 1 and K 2, functions
gk for k ∈ K 1 holding with equality, and functions hk for k ∈ K 2 holding with weak
inequality, where |K 1| = d − 1. Moreover, we have to show that |K 0(x¯)| ≤ 1 for
every x¯ ∈ M[g, h].
A point (t, σ ) belongs to L(Γ, p, B) if and only if there exists λ ∈ Rm and µ ∈ Rn
such that
vi (t, σ−i , sij ) + λij − µi = 0 (sij ∈ S)
σ ij = 0 (sij ∈ B)
λij = 0 (sij ∈ B)
∑
sij ∈Si
σ ij − 1 = 0 (i ∈ N )
σ ij ≥ 0 (sij ∈ B)
λij ≥ 0 (sij ∈ B)
t ≥ 0
−t + 1 ≥ 0.
(10)
The set K 1 corresponding to (10) has cardinality 2m + n. This is indeed one less than
the number of free variables, which is equal to 2m + n + 1. Unfortunately, (10) is
not a regular constraint set in general. The set corresponding to (9) may not consist of
independent vectors. Moreover, it is easy to construct examples such that |K 0(x¯)| ≥ 2
for some x¯ ∈ M[g, h]. Fortunately, such examples can be shown to be exceptional
cases. To prove that, the transversality theorem comes to rescue.
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We apply Theorem 11 in the following way. We take as the set of parameters Ω
the set of games, so Ω = Rm∗·n . Then we specify three types of systems of equations
where variables belong to a Euclidean space with appropriate dimension. The first type
consists of all equalities of (10), the second type of all equalities plus one inequality
of (10) formulated as an equality, and the third type of all equalities plus two inequal-
ities of (10) formulated as equalities. Thus we obtain three types of functions f , with
variables t, σ, λ, µ, ω, that can be shown to satisfy f  {0}, and as a consequence
f ω  {0} for almost every ω ∈ Ω . Counting the number of equations and unknowns,
using Theorem 10, it follows that a function f ω of the third type, with two inequali-
ties, can only be transversal if f ω−1{0} = ∅. From this we derive the conclusion that,
generically, it is impossible that two inequality constraints are binding at the same
time. The transversality of the first two types of functions leads to the conclusion that,
generically, (10) is a regular constraint set. This concludes the basic steps in the proof
of Theorem 12.
Using the representation of L(Γ, p, B) as a regular constraint set, we also find that
a point (t, σ ) is a boundary point of L(Γ, p, B) if and only if either σ ij = 0 for exactly
one sij ∈ B or exactly one sij ∈ B is a best response to σ−i , or t = 0, or t = 1. More-
over, two sets L(Γ, p, B) and L(Γ, p, B¯) can only have boundary points in common,
since otherwise (10) would have a solution with two inequality constraints binding at
the same time. When there is a common boundary point, there is an optimal strategy
sij that is played with zero probability, with the two admissible subsets only differing
in this strategy: (B ∪ B¯) \ (B ∩ B¯) = {sij }. Moreover, in each point at most two sets
can meet, as we would again obtain a case where (10) has two inequality constraints
binding at the same time. We see that all subsets L(Γ, p, B) of L(Γ, p) are nicely
connected. What we have obtained is a full non-linear analogue of the door-in door-out
principle of Lemke–Howson.
Theorem 13 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue
measure, L(Γ, p) is a compact one-dimensional piecewise C∞ manifold with bound-
ary. All boundary points of L(Γ, p) are in {0, 1}×Σ . The boundary point in {0}×Σ
is unique.
For almost every Γ and p, the set L(Γ, p) consists of a finite number of paths
and loops. Although it is not necessarily the case that these paths and loops are
smooth, the number of non-differentiabilities is finite at most. All paths in L(Γ, p)
start and end in {0, 1} × Σ . Each such path consists of a finite sequence of smooth
arcs of the sets L(Γ, p, B). A loop in L(Γ, p) consists either of a finite sequence
(at least two) of differentiable arcs in the sets L(Γ, p, B) or is a loop of one set
L(Γ, p, B).
Since L(Γ, p) consists of finitely many one-dimensional C∞ manifolds with
boundary, it is possible to use standardized software based on predictor–corrector
methods, to approximately follow each manifold. We refer the interested reader
to Allgower and Georg (1990) for a detailed exposition on predictor–corrector
methods.
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9.3 Smoothening the linear tracing procedure
It is attractive to avoid switching from one system of equations to the next, and to for-
mulate one, differentiable, system of equations whose solution corresponds toL(Γ, p).
This is the purpose of the current section.
Define, for α ∈ Rm , functions σ : Rm → Rm and λ : Rm → Rm by σ ij (α) =
[max{0, αij }]2 and λij (α) = [max{0,−αij }]2. Next consider the system
vi (t, σ−i (α), sij ) + λij (α) − µi = 0 (sij ∈ S)
∑
sij ∈Si
σ ij (α) − 1 = 0 (i ∈ N )
t ≥ 0
−t + 1 ≥ 0.
(11)
For each point (t, α, µ) satisfying the (in)equalities (11), the point (t, σ (α), λ(α), µ)
satisfies the (in)equalities (10) with B = { sij ∈ S | σ ij (α) > 0 }.
Let H : [0, 1]×Rm ×Rn → Rm ×Rn be the continuously differentiable homotopy
defined by
H(t, α, µ) =
⎛
⎝




j (α) − 1 (i ∈ N )
⎞
⎠ .
The zeros of this homotopy describe the linear tracing procedure: (t, α, µ) ∈ H−1({0})
if and only if (t, σ (α)) ∈ L(Γ, p). For a generic game and prior, there is a unique point
(0, α0, µ0) ∈ H−1({0}) at t = 0 at which our algorithm starts. Following the path
described by the zeros of H, we end up in a point (1, α˜, µ˜) ∈ H−1({0}). This point
generates the Nash equilibrium σ(α˜) of Γ selected by the Harsanyi–Selten theory.
Theorem 14 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebes-
gue measure, H−1({0}) is a compact one-dimensional C1 manifold with boundary.
All boundary points of H−1({0}) are in {0, 1} × Rm × Rn. The boundary point in
{0} × Rm × Rn is unique.
The set H−1({0}) consists of finitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All arcs
start and end in {0, 1} × Rm × Rn . Loops have no points in common with {0, 1} ×
R
m × Rn . There is exactly one arc that starts in {0} × Rm × Rn and that ends in
{1} × Rm × Rn with a point (1, α˜, µ˜) that generates the Nash equilibrium selected by
the tracing procedure. This arc is a transformation of the feasible path of the tracing
procedure. All other arcs start and end in {1} × Rm × Rn and connect two points
inducing Nash equilibria of Γ .
The structure of H−1({0}) is even simpler than the one of L(Γ, p). Not only, like
for L(Γ, p), are complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions
sets, diverging behavior, etc. excluded. The arcs and loops in H−1({0}) are differ-
entiable everywhere. It is the transformation of variables, via the functions σ(·) and
123
Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory 147
λ(·) that smoothes out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible to calculate
the derivative at each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow
the path by means of differentiable as opposed to simplicial methods. In Herings and
Peeters (2001) we report numerical results using the software-package Hompack, a
Fortran77 program. This program implements three predictor–corrector methods,
see Watson et al. (1987) for an introduction to Hompack.
9.4 An example
For the game in Fig. 1 and as prior the mixed strategy combination p = (( 12 , 12 ),
( 12 ,
1
2 )), the corresponding set L(Γ, p) is given by
L(Γ, p) = { (t, (s12 , s21 )) | t ∈ [0, 12 ] } ∪ { ( 12 , ((r, 1 − r), s21 )) | r ∈ [0, 56 ] }
∪ { (t, (( 3t+16t , 3t−16t ), ( 2t+14t , 2t−14t ))) | t ∈ [ 12 , 1] }.
At t = 0, for players 1 and 2, the strategies s12 and s21 respectively are the best
responses against the prior. The first part of the path of L(Γ, p) is therefore deter-
mined by L(Γ, p, B) for B = {s12 , s21 }. As long as t ≤ 12 the path stays at (s12 , s21 ). At
t = 12 strategy s11 of player 1 becomes optimal and has to be added to the admissible
set B such that the path continues in L(Γ, p, B) for B = {s11 , s12 , s21 }. In this new
component, at t = 12 the weight on player 1’s strategy s11 is increased until either
it gets weight 1 or until player 2’s unused strategy s22 becomes optimal. The latter
happens when the weight on strategy s11 reaches the value
5
6 . The final part of the path
is determined by the component L(Γ, p, B) with B including all strategies.
The first plot of Fig. 6 shows the values of t , σ, and λ along the homotopy path that
is generated by the linear tracing procedure as a function of pathlength τ . To make
the plot more clear, only informative values of the variables are depicted. In particular
this means that for each pure strategy sij , either σ
i
j or −λij is plotted, depending on
which one is non-zero. We see that at two values of τ kinks in the paths occur. These
values of τ correspond to the two points where we had to adapt the admissible subset
B in the description above.
The second plot shows the values of t and the coordinates of α as a function of
pathlength and therefore corresponds to the feasible path of the tracing procedure
after application of the transformation of variables. From the plot it is seen that the
transformation indeed causes the kinks in the path to disappear. At the points where
previously kinks occurred, now the derivatives of all variables with respect to path-
length are equal to zero, except the variable that passes zero at that point. It is precisely
the transformation of variables that does the trick. If the pathlength τ is interpreted as
the speed of path tracking, the transformation causes a delay in speed at points where
kinks occur in the original path.
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Fig. 6 The homotopy path before and after transformation
10 n-Person games: the McKelvey–Palfrey algorithm
Quantal response equilibria as introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) are sta-
tistical versions of Nash equilibria where each player’s payoff is subject to random
error. For a given specification of the error structure, a quantal response equilibrium
is a mixed strategy combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior subject to
that error structure. One possible interpretation of this is that players make calculation
errors according to some random process when calculating their expected payoffs.
Player i’s payoff when playing pure strategy sij against a mixed strategy combina-
tion σ−i is subject to error and is given by
uˆi (σ−i , sij ) = ui (σ−i , sij ) + εij .
We define εi = (εij )sij ∈Si and ε = (ε
i )i∈N . We assume that ε is determined by an
absolutely continuously distributed random variable ε with density function ϕ. More-
over, the random variables εi are independent and the expected value of each random
variable εij exists.
For any possible opponents’ mixed strategy combination σ−i , the sij —response set
Rij is defined as the set of error vectors that make strategy s
i
j the best response, so
Rij (σ
−i ) = { εi | uˆi (σ−i , sij ) ≥ uˆi (σ−i , sik) for all sik ∈ Si }.





ϕi (εi ) dεi .
The function π i is called the statistical reaction function, or the quantal response func-
tion and satisfies the feature that better strategies are more likely to be chosen than
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worse strategies. A quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a mixed strategy combi-
nation σ that is consistent with the error structure:
σ ij = π ij (σ−i ) for all sij ∈ Si and all i ∈ N .
For the following result, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Theorem 15 For any game Γ and for any density function ϕ, a QRE exists.
For any parameter λ ≥ 0, the logistic quantal response function is defined by
π ij (σ
−i ) = exp(λ u
i (σ−i , sij ))
∑
sik∈Si exp(λ u
i (σ−i , sik))
and is obtained as statistical reaction function when ϕi corresponds to the extreme
value (or log-Weibull) distribution. Therefore, if each player uses a logistic quantal
response function, the corresponding QRE, called logit equilibrium, requires that
σ ij =
exp(λ ui (σ−i , sij ))
∑
sik∈Si exp(λ u
i (σ−i , sik))
for all sij ∈ Si and all i ∈ N .
The parameter λ is inversely related to the error level. When λ = 0, the choice of the
players is completely determined by the errors which induces all players to play all
their pure strategies with equal probability. When λ approaches infinity, the influence
of the error disappears.






∣ σ ij =
exp(λ ui (σ−i , sij ))
∑
sik∈Si exp(λ u
i (σ−i , sik))
(sij ∈ Si , i ∈ N )
}
.
For the following result, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Theorem 16 When λ approaches infinity, the set of logit equilibria converges to a
subset of the set of Nash equilibria. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G with full
Lebesgue measure, the graph of L contains a unique path of logit equilibria that
starts at the centroid for λ = 0 and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as λ goes
to infinity.
The latter unique Nash equilibrium is called the limiting logit equilibrium of the
game Γ . This induces a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria by ‘tracing’
the graph of the logit equilibrium correspondence beginning at the centroid of the
mixed strategy simplex and continuing for increasing values of λ.
We define the correspondence L˜ : [0, 1] → Σ by
L˜(t) =
{L( t1−t ) if t ∈ [0, 1)
NE(Γ ) if t = 1.
For the following result, see Herings (2002).
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Theorem 17 For all games Γ ∈ G the graph of L˜ contains a component containing
an element at t = 0 and at t = 1.
The (homotopy) path of logit equilibria can be traced from the centroid at t = 0
towards the limiting logit equilibrium at t = 1 using one of the two methods described
in the previous two sections. Turocy (2005) describes a technique to efficiently trace
the unique branch generated by the logit equilibrium correspondence by exploiting
convergence properties of the logit QRE.
11 n-Person games: other algorithms
Govindan and Wilson (2003) provide a generalization of the Lemke–Howson algo-
rithm to n-person games. They indicate that one of the implications of the structure
theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) is that, above each generic ray emanating
from the game of interest (represented as a point in a Euclidean space), the graph of
the equilibrium correspondence is a one-dimensional manifold.3 Moreover, at suffi-
cient distance from the relevant game there is a unique equilibrium. Therefore, starting
from a sufficiently distant game along any generic ray, one can traverse the line seg-
ment to the relevant game, tracing the one-dimensional manifold of equilibria along
the way, to find an equilibrium of the game of interest at the terminus. Govindan
and Wilson (2003) propose to trace the manifold using a global Newton method. For
bimatrix games the Lemke–Howson and van den Elzen–Talman algorithms can be
understood as special cases of the procedure of Govindan and Wilson (2003). For the
Lemke–Howson algorithm this is also immediate from the exposition in Sect. 4.1. As
is shown in Balthasar (2009), also the linear tracing procedure for n-person games
can be formulated in terms of payoff perturbations corresponding to a generic ray
rather than our approach that is in terms of strategy perturbations. Govindan and Wil-
son (2004) iteratively use polymatrix approximations to increase the speed of their
algorithm presented in Govindan and Wilson (2003) by exploiting the presence of
linearities.
Another notable equilibrium selection method that has a bounded rationality inter-
pretation is the t—solution (Rosenthal (1989)). Voorneveld (2006) showed that for
every game the set of t—solutions constitutes a homotopy path starting at t = 0 and
terminating in a Nash equilibrium at t = 1. A nice feature of this selection theory is
that along the homotopy path players eliminate successively higher levels of never-
best replies and eventually play only rationalizable strategies with positive probability
(see Voorneveld (2006)). This path can be followed using the techniques presented in
the next two sections.
Yamamoto (1993) presents a homotopy to compute a proper Nash equilibrium.
Yamamoto makes use of an expanding set to define a homotopy whose homotopy-
path connects the centroid of the simplotope to a solution of a stationary point problem
that is a Nash equilibrium of the original game.
3 Such a result can also be obtained by applying the tools from differential topology explained in Sect. 9.1.
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12 Extensive form and dynamic games
Since extensive form games can be represented as a game in normal form, in prin-
ciple it is possible to apply any of the algorithms of the previous sections. There are
two caveats. First, since the normal form representation of an extensive form game is
non-generic, it becomes crucial to handle degeneracies appropriately. Second, from
a computational point of view, it might be much more attractive to work with the
extensive form representation where the data structure is relatively more concise.
Here, we will restrict ourselves to a brief overview of this important stream of the
literature.
Wilson (1972) applied the Lemke–Howson algorithm to a two-person extensive
form game. By making use of the extensive form directly, the developed method never
deals with the entire linear complementary problem, and leads to significant savings
in storage.
In the same journal issue, von Stengel (1996) and Koller et al. (1996) propose algo-
rithms to solve two-person extensive form games: the first for the class of such games
with zero-sum payoff structure, the latter for general payoffs. Both papers study the
sequence form, rather than the normal form, of the extensive form game. The advan-
tage of the sequence form in comparison to the normal form is that the size of the
sequence form is linear and not exponentially in the size of the game tree. For the
resulting problem the algorithm of Lemke (1965) is applied.
von Stengel et al. (2002) present another algorithm for solving two-person exten-
sive form games with perfect recall. Just like von Stengel (1996) and Koller et al.
(1996), the sequence form is used rather than the normal form, but instead of applying
Lemke’s algorithm, the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm is used. The advantages of
that method are the potential to find multiple equilibria and to find normal form perfect
equilibria.
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) extend the (logit) quantal response equilibrium
defined for normal form games to the (logit) agent quantal response equilibrium
(AQRE) for extensive form games. In an AQRE, at each information set players
choose better strategies with higher probabilities than worse strategies. They show
that limit points of the logit AQRE yield a refinement of sequential equilibria for any
finite extensive form game, but are not logically related to other refinement criteria
such as the intuitive criterion or trembling hand perfection.
For stochastic games, homotopy based algorithms have been proposed by Filar and
Raghavan (1984), Nowak and Raghavan (1993), and Raghavan and Syed (2002). All
papers concentrate on two-person games with the single-controller property, i.e. only
one player has partial control over the state transitions: the first for discounted games
with zero-sum payoff structure, the second for discounted games with general payoff
structure, the third for undiscounted games. In all papers a stationary equilibrium is
defined as a solution to a linear complementary problem, where linearity is obtained
as a result of the single-controller property. Subsequently, Lemke’s (1965) algorithm
is applied to solve for a stationary equilibrium.
Herings and Peeters (2004) extend the linear tracing procedure to a related proce-
dure that is suitable for general finite discounted stochastic games. By application of
the technique presented in Sect. 9, the extension is shown to possess the same geomet-
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ric properties as the linear tracing procedure for normal form games. By numerically
following the exact homotopy path, which is shown to be generically unique, an
approximation of a stationary equilibrium results. Since this method allows for an
arbitrary starting point, it has the potential to find multiple stationary equilibria.
13 Computing all Nash equilibria
For some purposes, an algorithm to compute a single equilibrium may be insufficient.
Even if the algorithm is able to compute an equilibrium that satisfies perfectness or
some other refinement criterion, it cannot be ruled out that there might exist another
equilibrium that is more salient. For some equilibrium selection theories compari-
son of equilibria is needed, such as payoff dominance or risk dominance. Moreover,
multiple equilibria with different implications (in the comparative statics) may exist.
We therefore have an interest in algorithms to compute all equilibria. In the same issue
of this journal, Avis et al. (2009) survey algorithms for finding all Nash equilibria of
a bimatrix game.
Homotopy-based algorithms that are developed to solve for all Nash equilibria are
developed in Kostreva and Kinard (1991) and Herings and Peeters (2005). Both meth-
ods are based on the application of numerical techniques to obtain all the solutions
to a system of polynomial equations. Kostreva and Kinard (1991) focuses on solving
for polynomial optimization problems in general and bimatrix games in particular.
Herings and Peeters (2005) concentrates on solving n-person noncooperative games
for all its Nash equilibria. The proposed method is shown to be globally convergent
for an open set of games with full Lebesgue measure.
Datta (2009) presents an algorithm for the computation of all Nash equilibria in
generic games. Starting from a specially structured factorizable system the algorithm
uses polyhedral homotopy continuation to solve for the equilibria. The Gröbner basis
(that is also used in Herings and Peeters (2005)) is applied to gain more geometric
information about how the solution set varies with the payoff function.
Recent developments in solving systems of polynomial equations are likely to result
in improvements in homotopy methods to compute all Nash equilibria, as well as to
new insights in issues concerning the number of Nash equilibria in a game. For a
state-of-the-art account of research in systems of polynomial equations, as well as an
application to game theory, see Sturmfels (2002).
We have already stressed that even games of modest size may have an enormous
number of Nash equilibria. To compute all Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game of
moderate size is therefore not feasible within reasonable time limits. The problem is
alleviated somewhat since the algorithms described above generate more and more
Nash equilibria during their execution. There is no need to wait for the algorithm to
terminate before the first output can be observed. Furthermore, it is possible to apply
parallel computing to speed up computations.
Also, many games coming from economic applications are not arbitrary, but have a
particular structure that may even lead to uniqueness of equilibrium. Instead of an algo-
rithm that determines all Nash equilibria of the game of interest, the economist may be
satisfied with an answer to the question whether a particular game has a unique equilib-
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rium or not. Unfortunately, even the much more modest problem of deciding whether
a game has a unique equilibrium or not is NP-complete (Gilboa and Zemel 1989).
An alternative uniqueness test consists of running the van den Elzen–Talman algo-
rithm for bimatrix games or the Herings–Peeters algorithm for n-person games for
a variety of starting points. If the algorithm returns the same equilibrium irrespec-
tive of the starting point, then, though perhaps not unique, the equilibrium found has
at least a very large basin of attraction. If, by varying the starting point, a second
equilibrium is found, then it is also possible to find a third one, as long as the game is
nondegenerate. The reason for this is that homotopy algorithms always terminate in a
positively indexed equilibrium. A homotopy determines a path from the starting point
towards one equilibrium, and connects the remaining equilibria in a pairwise manner.
Each connected pair consist of a positively and a negatively indexed equilibrium. If a
second equilibrium is found, then it is possible to find a third one, by following the
path that connects the first equilibrium to another one.
14 Conclusions
The paper presents an overview of homotopy algorithms as applied to non-cooperative
game theory. Advantages of homotopy algorithms include their numerical stability,
their ability to locate multiple solutions, and the insight they provide in the properties
of solutions. Homotopy algorithms can be implemented easily with the aid of existing,
professionally programmed, software.
From an algorithmic point of view, it is useful to distinguish bimatrix games from
games with more than two players. The reason is that the problem of finding a Nash
equilibrium in a bimatrix games is equivalent to solving a linear complementarity
problem, whereas the general problem is equivalent to solving a non-linear comple-
mentarity problem, and has to rely on numerical approximation techniques.
We present two algorithms in detail that are suitable to compute Nash equilibria
for bimatrix games, the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman
algorithm. We argue that both algorithms are best understood as following a solution
path generated by a homotopy. We also explain how the door-in door-out principle of
Lemke–Howson applies to both algorithms.
For general n-person games, it is usually not possible to compute an equilibrium
exactly, which calls for different methods. We present the two main ideas in detail,
one using simplicial methods, the other predictor–corrector methods. The Herings–van
den Elzen algorithm relies on the simplicial approach, the Herings–Peeters algorithm
on the predictor–corrector idea. Both algorithms converge to an approximate Nash
equilibrium for general n-person games. For both methods we also illustrate how they
can be understood as following a solution path generated by a homotopy. We also
explain how the door-in door-out principle of Lemke–Howson applies to both algo-
rithms. The third method we present to find a Nash equilibrium of a general n-person
game is related to the quantal-response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey.
Since the number of Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game tends to be enormous (see
McLennan 2005), we emphasize the importance of computing a Nash equilibrium
with a good game-theoretical underpinning. The algorithms of van den Elzen–Talman,
Herings–van den Elzen, and Herings–Peeters are all related to the equilibrium selection
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methods of Harsanyi and Selten. The McKelvey–Palfrey algorithm has an interesting
behavioral interpretation.
We have presented an overview of how homotopy methods have been applied to
games in extensive form and to dynamic games, and how homotopy methods can be
used to compute all Nash equilibria of a game. We think that these are still underex-
plored research areas and we expect more exciting work to be done in the future.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Allgower, E.L., Georg, K.: Numerical Continuation Methods: An Introduction. Berlin: Springer (1990)
Avis, D., Rosenberg, G., Savani, R., von Stengel, B.: Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games.
Econ Theory (2009, this issue)
Balthasar, A.: Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games. Econ Theory (2009, this issue)
Browder, F.E.: On continuity of fixed points under deformations of continuous mappings. Summa
Brasiliensis Math 4, 183–191 (1960)
Datta, R.S.: Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra. Econ Theory (2009, this
issue)
Eaves, B.C.: Polymatrix games with joint constraints. SIAM J Appl Math 24, 418–423 (1973)
Eaves, B.C., Schmedders, K.: General equilibrium models and homotopy methods. J Econ Dyn Con-
trol 23, 1249–1279 (1999)
van den Elzen, A.H., Talman, A.J.J.: A procedure for finding Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games. ZOR
Methods Models Oper Res 35, 27–43 (1991)
van den Elzen, A.H., Talman, A.J.J.: An algorithmic approach toward the tracing procedure for bi-matrix
games. Games Econ Behav 28, 130–145 (1999)
Filar, J.A., Raghavan, T.E.S.: A matrix game solution of a single controller stochastic game. Math Oper
Res 9, 356–362 (1984)
Garcia, C.B., Zangwill, W.I.: Pathways to Solutions, Fixed Points, and Equilibria. Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice Hall (1981)
Garcia, C.B., Lemke, C.E., Lüthi, H.J.: Simplicial approximation of an equilibrium point of noncoopera-
tive n-person games. In: Hu, T.C., Robinson, S.M. (eds.) Mathematical Programming, pp. 227–260.
New York: Academic Press (1973)
Geanakoplos, J.D.: Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer. Econ Theory 21, 585–603 (2003)
Gilboa, I., Zemel, E.: Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games Econ
Behav 1, 80–93 (1989)
Govindan, S., Wilson, R.: A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria. J Econ Theory 110,
65–86 (2003)
Govindan, S., Wilson, R.: Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation. J Econ Dyn
Control 28, 1229–1241 (2004)
Harsanyi, J.C.: The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooper-
ative games. Int J Game Theory 4, 61–94 (1975)
Harsanyi, J.C., Selten, R.: A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge: MIT
Press (1988)
Herings, P.J.J.: A globally and universally stable price adjustment process. J Math Econ 27, 163–193 (1997)
Herings, P.J.J.: Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. Econ Theory 15, 485–
490 (2000)
Herings, P.J.J.: Universally converging adjustment processes—a unifying approach. J Math Econ 38, 341–
370 (2002)
Herings, P.J.J., van den Elzen, A.H.: Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure
in n-person games. Games Econ Behav 38, 89–117 (2002)
Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R.: A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of n-person games. Econ
Theory 18, 159–185 (2001)
123
Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory 155
Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R.: Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection and computation.
J Econ Theory 118, 32–60 (2004)
Herings, P.J.J., Peeters, R.: A globally convergent algorithm to compute all Nash equilibria for n-person
games. Ann Oper Res 137, 349–368 (2005)
Howson, J.T. Jr.: Equilibria of polymatrix games. Manag Sci 21, 313–315 (1972)
Howson, J.T. Jr., Rosenthal, R.W.: Bayesian equilibria of finite two-person games with incomplete infor-
mation. Manag Sci 21, 313–315 (1974)
Jongen, H.Th., Jonker, P., Twilt, F.: Nonlinear optimization in Rn , I. Morse Theory, Chebyshev Approxi-
mation. Methoden und Verfahren der Mathematischen Physik, 29. Frankfurt: Peter Lang (1983)
Judd, K.L.: Computational economics and economic theory: substitutes or complements? J Econ Dyn
Control 21, 907–942 (1997)
Kohlberg, E., Mertens, J.F.: On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1003–1037 (1986)
Koller, D., Megiddo, N., von Stengel, B.: Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person
games. Games Econ Behav 14, 247–259 (1996)
Kostreva, M.M., Kinard, L.A.: A differential homotopy approach for solving polynomial optimization
problems and noncooperative games. Comput Math Appl 21, 135–143 (1991)
van der Laan, G., Talman, A.J.J., van der Heijden, L.: Simplicial variable dimension algorithms for solving
the nonlinear complementarity problem on a product of unit simplices using a general labelling. Math
Oper Res 12, 377–397 (1987)
Lemke, C.E.: Bimatrix equilibrium points and mathematical programming. Manag Sci 11, 681–689 (1965)
Lemke, C.E., Howson, J.T. Jr.: Equilibrium points of bimatrix games. SIAM J Appl Math 12, 413–423 (1964)
Mas-Colell, A.: A note on a theorem of F. Browder. Math Program 6, 229–233 (1974)
Mas-Colell, A.: The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium, a Differentiable Approach. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press (1985)
McKelvey, R.D., McLennan, A.: Computation of equilibria in finite games. In: Amman, H.M.,
Kendrick, D.A., Rust, J. (eds.) Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. I, pp. 87–142. Amsterdam:
Elsevier/North-Holland (1996)
McKelvey, R.D., Palfrey, T.R.: Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econ
Behav 10, 6–38 (1995)
McKelvey, R.D., Palfrey, T.R.: Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Exp Econ 1, 9–41
(1998)
McLennan, A.: The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game. Econometrica 73, 141–174
(2005)
Nowak, A.S., Raghavan, T.E.S.: A finite step algorithm via a bimatrix game to a single controller nonzero-
sum stochastic game. Math Program 59, 249–259 (1993)
Raghavan, T.E.S., Syed, Z.: Computing stationary Nsh equilibria of undiscounted single-controller stochas-
tic games. Math Oper Res 22, 384–400 (2002)
Rosenmüller, J.: On a generalization of the Lemke–Howson algorithm to noncooperative n-person
games. SIAM J Appl Math 21, 73–79 (1971)
Rosenthal, R.W.: A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games. Int J Game The-
ory 18, 273–292 (1989)
Schanuel, S.H., Simon, L.K., Zame, W.R.: The algebraic geometry of games and the tracing procedure.
In: Selten, R. (ed.) Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals and Markets, pp. 9–43. Berlin:
Springer (1991)
Shapley, L.S.: A note on the Lemke–Howson algorithm. Mathematical programming study. Pivoting
Ext 1, 175–189 (1974)
von Stengel, B.: Efficient computation of behavior strategies. Games Econ Behav 14, 220–246 (1996)
von Stengel, B.: Computing equilibria for two-person games. In: Aumann, R.J., Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook
of Game Theory, chap. 45, vol. 3, pp. 1723–1759. Amsterdam: North-Holland (2002)
von Stengel, B., van den Elzen, A.H., Talman, A.J.J.: Computing normal form perfect equilibria for extensive
two-person games. Econometrica 70, 693–715 (2002)
Sturmfels, B.: Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations. American Mathematical Society, CBMS Regional
Conferences Series, No. 97. Rhode Island, Providence (2002)
Todd, M.J.: The computation of fixed points and applications. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical
Systems, vol. 124. Berlin: Springer (1976)
Turocy, T.L.: A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistical quantal response equilibrium correspon-
dence. Games Econ Behav 51, 243–263 (2005)
123
156 P. J. J. Herings, R. Peeters
Voorneveld, M.: Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal’s t-solutions. Int J Game The-
ory 34, 105–122 (2006)
Watson, L.T., Billups, S.C., Morgan, A.P.: HOMPACK: a suite of codes for globally convergent homotopy
algorithms. ACM Trans Math Softw 13, 281–310 (1987)
Wilson, R.: Computing equilibria of n-person games. SIAM J Appl Math 21, 80–87 (1971)
Wilson, R.: Computing equilibria of two-person games from the extensive form. Manag Sci 18, 448–460
(1972)
Wilson, R.: Computing simply stable equilibria. Econometrica 60, 1039–1070 (1992)
Yamamoto, Y.: A path-following procedure to find a proper equilibrium of finite games. Int J Game Theory
22, 249–259 (1993)
Yanovskaya, E.B.: Equilibrium points in polymatrix games. Litovskii Matematicheskii Sbornik 8, 381–384
(1986) (in Russian) (see also Math Rev 39, # 3831)
123
